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Shaking oﬀ the neoliberal shackles: “democratic
emergence” and the negotiation of democratic
knowledge in the Middle East North Africa context
Jeﬀ Bridoux
Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK
ABSTRACT
There is a general assumption in democracy promotion that liberal democracy is the
panacea that will solve all political and economic problems faced by developing
countries. Using the concept of “good society” as analytical prism, the analysis
shows that while there is a rhetorical agreement as to what the “good society”
entails, democracy promotion practices fail to allow for recipients’ inclusion in the
negotiation and delivery of the “good society”. Contrasting US and Tunisian
discourses on the “good society”, the article argues that democracy promotion
practices are underpinned by neoliberal parameters borne out from a reliance on
the transition paradigm, which in turn leave little room to democracy promotion
recipients to formulate knowledge claims supporting the emergence of alternative
conceptions of the “good society”. In contrast, the article opens up a reﬂective
pathway to a negotiated democratic knowledge, which would reside in a
paradigmatic change that consists in the abandonment of the transition paradigm
in favour of a “democratic emergence” paradigm.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 22 June 2018; Accepted 5 December 2018
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Introduction
This contribution to the special issue on “Negotiating the Promotion of Democracy”
looks at the issue of inclusivity of recipients of democracy promotion in the negotiation
of what democracy means and what it is supposed to deliver; the “good society”. Refer-
ring to the range of issues open to negotiations in the context of democracy promotion,
this contribution focuses thus on normative premises that shape interactions in democ-
racy promotion. The article seeks to answer the following questions: To what extent is
democratic knowledge negotiated between democracy promoters and recipients? In
what way could democracy promoters generate more knowledge about recipients’ con-
ceptions of democracy and conceptions of a “good society”?
The article starts with a review of the literature on democratization with a special
emphasis on the wider question of replicability of liberal democracy and local
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ownership. The article then deﬁnes the concept of “good society”; the analytical prism
used to identify the value-commitments of democracy promoters and recipients in their
production of democratic knowledge. The article performs a critical discourse analysis
of the Obama administration’s speeches, policies, and reports from 2007 to 2014, when
the Obama administration deﬁned and started to implement its approach to democracy
promotion. This discourse is then contrasted with knowledge claims and expectations
about democracy made by Tunisians since 2012. These expectations are analysed based
on focus groups reports published by NDI,1 and on my own ﬁeldwork conducted in
2014. I organized focus groups with 45 Tunisian students in Sousse to tease out their
understandings of the meaning of democracy and their expectations.
Tunisia is of particular interest due to the extensive US support to the process of
democratization; thus constituting a relevant space in which contested notions of
democracy come into play. The Tunisian experience may not be entirely relied on to
expand ﬁndings to other MENA2 countries but nevertheless provides interesting and
pertinent insights into contestation of democratic knowledge in an Arab context. In
turn, such insights could prompt a reﬂection on how to improve current democracy
promotion practices to facilitate negotiations with recipients. Genuine negotiations
about the meaning of democracy are essential to maximize recipients’ expectations
informing democratic futures, if the MENA region eventually manages to dispose of
the shackles of authoritarianism.
Section one concludes that recipients’ expectations are in line with democracy pro-
moters’ discourses on democracy and “good society”. Yet, despite of this alignment,
practices reveal that the model promoted remains liberal democracy and free
markets, without much preoccupation for social justice claims made by recipients.
The second section shows a discrepancy between US discourse on democracy
promotion and practices through the establishment of priorities that do not reﬂect the
concerns of democracy promotion recipients. The article brieﬂy reviews the literature
on modernization theory and the transition paradigm and then claims that the source
of the discrepancy identiﬁed above resides precisely in the domination of such paradigms
in development aid communities, and more particularly in democracy promotion. This
domination translates into the adoption of neoliberal practices that reduce democracy
promotion to a depoliticized technical agenda seeking to implement donors’ model of
democracy. Current democracy promotion practices, ensconced in neoliberal parameters,
do not lead to a genuine empowerment of recipients through a mutual acceptance of
respective knowledge claims made about democracy and value-commitments to a
“good society”. Such a conclusion is problematic when considering the potential for nego-
tiation between democracy promoters and recipients about the meaning of democracy.
The third section of the paper opens up a reﬂection on how better knowledge of
democracy and of each other’s expectations and aspirations can improve the
outcome of democracy promotion. Such a reﬂection includes a reconsideration of
modernization theory and the transition paradigm as keystones of democracy pro-
motion practices. The article oﬀers a “way ahead” in terms of consciously changing
the reaﬃrmation of the structure brought about by the transition paradigm and neo-
liberal practices. The article argues that the outcome of a critical analysis of democ-
racy promotion practices begs for the need to revisit democratic knowledge. One
pathway to a negotiated democratic knowledge resides in a paradigmatic change
that consists in the abandonment of the transition paradigm in favour of a “demo-
cratic emergence” paradigm.
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Issues on negotiation table: the non-negotiation of democratic
knowledge and the “good society”
Studies in democratization focus on comparative analysis of replicability of institutional
frameworks and democratic values in countries undergoing political transition,3 on
socio-economic conditions enabling democratization,4 on the impact of democracy
aid,5 and on democratization through a shift towards empowerment and local owner-
ship of democratization processes.6 The article speaks to the four main debates that
animate democratization studies but focuses especially on the replicability of liberal
democracy and impact of democracy promotion issues.
The universal character of liberal democracy is not questioned by some7 or even
though there is an acknowledgement that there is a variety of Western and non-
Western models of democracy on oﬀer, the irrelevancy of a liberal model of democracy
is questioned.8 Instead, the argument goes, variations of democratic models can happen
within the limits of liberalism, and there is scepticism about the potential of non-
Western democratic models to lead to genuine democratization. Indeed, there is a
risk that turning away from liberal democracy may lead to illiberal democracy or
semi-democracy in the best of cases, or to a return to authoritarianism in the worse
cases.9
Such a position became questionable. While the world has witnessed signiﬁcant pol-
itical and economic liberal gains in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa
since 1989, the literature has recorded a reversal of the trend towards political and econ-
omic liberalization in many countries.10 Following the Arab Uprising of 2010, many
observers, claimed that democratic progress was once again on the march. The Arab
Uprising would give a second chance to Western-led democracy aid to facilitate the
rise of new democratic polities in a region where political liberalization was notoriously
lagging behind.11
Yet, despite initial hopes, the processes of political liberalization in most countries
aﬀected by democratic uprisings petered out. Ideas and values articulated by Western
democracy aid do not seem to generate traction across all segments of Middle
Eastern and North African societies.12 This is especially baﬄing in the wake of the
Arab Spring, when large sections of the populations rejected authoritarian regimes
and called for alternative values than those oﬀered by those regimes: freedom, democ-
racy, liberty, and most importantly dignity and social justice; the very same values enun-
ciated by Western donor agencies.13
This contribution suggests that part of the explanation for such a mitigated outcome
resides in too little attention paid to actors at the receiving end of political aid. Indeed,
the article contends that it is important to comprehend meanings attributed by recipi-
ents of democracy aid to the concept of democracy and to what kind of society they
wish to see emerge. This shift need not only to be rhetorical but translate into practices
that genuinely include the “local”.
The concept of “good society” is a useful analytical prism to contrast US discourses
on with Tunisian discourses on democracy and expectations of a “good society”.
According to Etzioni, the concept “good society” refers to the formulation and uphold-
ing of “some particular social conceptions of the good” and is centred around a core of
substantive, particularistic values.14 He adds that “good societies promote particularis-
tic, substantive formations of the good; that these are limited sets of core values that are
promoted largely by the moral voice and not by state coercion.”15 This last point is
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particularly important for the purpose of this article: values that constitute a speciﬁc
deﬁnition of the “good society” should not be imposed by the state but emerge from
the moral stance of society stemming from a “shared moral dialogue.”16 The
outcome of this shared moral dialogue results in the prioritization of speciﬁc values
that contribute to the deﬁnition of a “good society”. Liberals favour individual
freedom and a limited role for the state.17 Social conservatives promote order and secur-
ity.18 Utilitarians such as Bentham privilege happiness.19 Marxists are interested in
material needs and economic justice.20 Whatever the value-commitment a society for-
mulates, what matters is that these speciﬁc values constitute what society identiﬁes as
essential for its well-being. The “good society” is not uniﬁed and varies from one
country to another. There are thus many formulations of what a “good society”
entails, all particular and reﬂecting the speciﬁc value-commitments of societies.21
As an illustration, the article now brieﬂy compares the Obama administration and
Tunisian value-claims about the “good society”. Far from being technical (speciﬁc
material measures will lead to “good society”), knowledge about the right types of
measures to be implemented reﬂects a normative and political commitment to a
speciﬁc conception of how a “good society” works. The key question, however, is
whether such a conception of the “good society” is in line with expectations of democ-
racy promotion recipients.
US democracy promotion and the quest for the “good society”
The various contributors to the literature on US democracy promotion disagree on
many things such as the purpose of promoting democracy,22 the potential destabiliza-
tion eﬀects on societies subjected to democracy promotion, or the wisdom of trying to
impose democracy on non-democratic societies.23 They, however, tend to agree that
when it comes to democracy promotion, the United States seeks to project an image of
a successful economy, a diverse society, and a strong and stable political system.24 Free
market economy, protection of fundamental freedoms, and liberal democracy are the
main ingredients that generate this success. Promoting this recipe is not only in the
interest of the United States but above all in the interest of recipients of democracy
promotion and the world as democratic nations contribute to a peaceful and prosper-
ous world. As expressed in the National Security Strategy 2010: supporting human
rights and democracy abroad is necessary because “governments that respect these
values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate” and because “[p]olitical systems that
protect universal rights are ultimately more stable, successful, and secure”.25 Democ-
racy thus contributes to the making of good societies. But what is meant by “good
society”?
A “good society” has two facets. The political dimension refers to the democratic
nature of society. It is a society that lives by the rule of law and respect for human
rights, enacts genuine and competitive elections and political processes, harbours a
dynamic and politically active civil society, and has a government that is transparent
and accountable.26 The economic dimension refers to the social and economic needs
of the populations. These needs must be addressed if democracy is to succeed in
countries undergoing democratic transition.
Compared to more classical approaches to democratization that focus on prioritiza-
tion of elections, institutional capacity building, development of democratic culture,
protection of human rights and empowerment of civil society, as well as on an
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expansive economic liberalism advocating free markets to foster economic growth,27
the Obama administration insists on economic development as essential to democratic
success. Discourse analysis shows that social and economic justice, gender equality, and
the ﬁght against corruption are all identiﬁed as advancing democracy.28 The US oﬃcial
discourse thus considers that to successfully democratize, governments need to institu-
tionalize the exercise of democracy by their populations and provide economic and
social beneﬁts that make their societies just and better: “good societies”. It is indeed
critical to address “underlying political and economic deﬁcits that foster instability,
enable radicalization and extremism” and hence limit the capacity of governments to
deal with threats and to address global common challenges.29 Obama thus develops a
more holistic approach to democracy and democracy promotion: democracy, human
rights, and economic development are seen as mutually supportive, and in addition
to freedom, dignity and social justice are essential to ensure the success of liberalization
on the long term to achieve a “good society”.30
Thus, the US rhetoric on democracy promotion conceptualizes a “good society” as
democratic, based on a representative government, with a high degree of citizen partici-
pation in governance and public aﬀairs, and allowing for a “more bottom-up, commu-
nity-based system of economic and social management than the centralized,
bureaucratized, liberal-capitalist system evident among advanced industrial states
today”.31 Is this conceptualization of the “good society” in line with democracy pro-
motion recipients’ expectations?
What do recipients want?
Tunisian citizens identify socio-economic issues as the most pressing. Their conceptu-
alization of democracy and the “good society” it is supposed to deliver puts socio-econ-
omic concerns at the centre of their claims to knowledge about democracy. For
example, unemployment remains their main preoccupation32 and a direct link is estab-
lished between dignity and consideration for democracy:
You have to provide people with a minimal amount of dignity for them to think about democ-
racy, because you cannot give democracy to people who can barely make it to the next day, and
maybe we don’t have that kind of sharp poverty in Tunisia as in other African countries, now we
do, yes, but how can you give, like, someone who does not have food, and talk about
democracy?33
We are not feeling secure. We have neither stable jobs nor health insurance (CNSS) and people
are even unable to feed their kids!!34
We made a revolution because of unemployment, but on the contrary it’s getting worse than it
used to be.35
These statements clearly identify basic socio-economic needs as pressing. People
need to be able to provide for their families, they need a stable source of income,
they need access to healthcare, and they need to feel secure on the long term. Democ-
racy is not an end in itself but a means to achieve these objectives:
The way that you are putting things is, you are suggesting that democracy is an end in itself. It is
not an end, it is a means. At the end, why do we need democracy? We need democracy to have a
better life as human beings, not as nationals, not as Tunisians, not as Arabs, as Muslims, but as
human beings.36
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Such a better life can be achieved in a “good society”, a society that protects liberal
values but only to a certain extent. A viable democratic regime in Tunisia, it seems,
would also need to include an active role played by the government in the management
of the economy. Thus, it seems that the Obama administration’s take on the “good
society” and its concerns for a just society are in line with the expectations of Tunisians:
The politicians should try to drive the country out of the crisis, and create safety nets for the
people like it happened in UK and the US in the time of the Great Depression, like the New
Deal. We need Medicare, we need it because the revolution was, I mean, poverty and unemploy-
ment was the spark that ignited the revolution, so people are still unemployed, people are still
poor… 37
Tunisians support democracy but not any kind of democracy. The model of democ-
racy that seems to generate most traction in the region will have to deliver on economic
well-being above all other considerations. As Heydemann argues, the grievances of
populations in the MENA region stem from two decades of market-oriented reforms
and their eﬀects on society. The MENA populations formulate a fundamental critique
of markets with the main drivers of the Arab Spring being “economic exclusion and
inequality, economic insecurity and vulnerability, failures of authoritarian governments
to protect citizens from worst eﬀects of market-oriented economic reforms”.38 In the
wake of years of failure of social and economic policies, these populations wish to see
a new social contract with commitment to distributive justice. This is their deﬁnition
of the “good society”.
It thus seems that both US democracy promotion and recipients share a similar
notion of what a “good society” entails. It is important to note, however, that this simi-
larity ends at the level of rhetoric. The following section observes that when it comes to
democracy promotion practices, these concerns for dignity, social justice, and equality
are pushed in the background. It appears that the type of democracy promoted by the
US is essentially neoliberal in nature, with a clear advantage given to policies that
promote the opening of markets, without much consideration for the eﬀects that
these may have on the populations concerned. The translation of social justice and
dignity concerns from rhetoric to practices has not gained traction.
Parameters: neoliberal pathways to democratization
Knowledge and power: modernization theory and transition paradigm
While there is an agreement that democratization consists in achieving “political
changes moving in a democratic direction”,39 the identiﬁcation of independent vari-
ables that facilitates democratization remains elusive.40 Democratic theory oﬀers a
large body of literature on macro-mechanisms to help analysts to understand what
causes democratic governance. They constitute the knowledge basis of modernization
theory and transition paradigm. Lipset argued that socioeconomic development levels
constitute pre-requisites for successful democratization.41 Others argue that the way
elites interact and the type of authoritarian regime in which bargaining takes place
are critical for democratization to succeed.42 Political culture and civil society constitute
another independent variable useful to assess the potential for democratization.
Almond and Verba argue that people’s attitudes towards each other, their government
and policies, democracy, and values underpinning democracy are critical to assess the
quality of democracy and likelihood of democratic transition.43 Education and high
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literacy rates constitute another independent variable that helps to sustain the belief in
democratic norms and make people less permeable to “extremist and monistic doc-
trines”.44 Political institutions that privilege negotiations, cooperation, and compromise
are more conducive to democratization than political institutions that tend to the power
of speciﬁc political factions to the detriment of others.45 Democratic theorists also
contend that national and social unity contributes to democratization. Ethnic or reli-
gious divisions, or social disparity impede on democratic development.46 At a structural
level of analysis, the pressures generated by the international context on nation-states
also constitute an independent variable that explains the likelihood of democratic con-
solidation.47 Finally, Pevehouse argues that democracy is facilitated in regions where
democratic countries are already established or where political liberalization is
happening.48
Yet, knowledge and experiences that underpin modernization theory and transition
paradigm are proving problematic on two grounds. Firstly, the transition paradigm’s
main assumptions, growing from experiences of 1990s democratization in Eastern
Europe, have become gradually irrelevant.49 This is particularly the case for “grey-
zone” countries; countries that are not authoritarian but also not heading in the direc-
tion of democracy: “what is often thought of as an uneasy, precarious middle ground
between full-ﬂedged democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most
common political condition today of countries in the developing world and the post-
communist world.”50
Secondly, the reliance on a ﬁxed set of knowledge claims of democratization deﬁned
by Western practices and experiences institutes a hierarchy of power between democ-
racy promoters and recipients. As Sadiki argues: “Democratic knowledge, theoretical or
practical, is not neutral. It is implicated in the web of power relations that is moulded by
knowledge or, in turn, moulds it.”51 Democratization studies and democracy promotion
practices focus on Western-centric transitional mechanistic processes aiming at the
replication of the Third Wave of democratization through an analysis of variables
such as “institutions, elite cohesion, ruling parties, elections, coalitions, impact of
democracy promotion, security, and in the case of Arab countries, role of Islam in
absence of democracy.”52 This is problematic because it causes a disconnect between
theory – the transition paradigm – and conditions on the ground.53 As will be devel-
oped further in this article, a reconsideration of the assumptions made by the transition
paradigm is needed. It is critical for democracy promoters to engage in a genuine
process of negotiation of democratic knowledge with recipients rather than for democ-
racy promotion to remain shackled to assumptions that do not reﬂect the political and
social realities of countries democracy promoters intervene in. The lack of ﬂexibility
imposed by the transition paradigm and modernization theory actually impedes on
democratic progress and on the emergence of a conceptualization of the “good
society” by recipients of democracy promotion.
Neoliberal practices and technocratic agenda
This lack of ﬂexibility on behalf of democracy promoters is further compounded by
development aid practices, including democracy promotion. Such practices are the
product of neoliberalism, the dominant philosophy in Western societies; neoliberalism
conceived as a “politically imposed discourse … a speciﬁc economic discourse or phil-
osophy which has become dominant and eﬀective in world economic relations as a
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consequence of super-power sponsorship [the US]”.54 As Harvey puts it: “neoliberalism
… has pervasive eﬀects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorpor-
ated into the common-sense many of us interpret, live in and understand the world.”55
As [Author] argues, knowledge produced by Western government and organization is
neoliberal in nature: “Positivism and quantitative methods are embedded in all attempts
to generate knowledge about and in all manners of managing the social world.”56 Such
speciﬁc knowledge is needed to maximize the neoliberal zeitgeist that shifts the focus of
economic activity as organizing principle of all social and political relations on compe-
tition between economic actors, in contrast to classical liberalism and its focus on
exchange.57 The maximization of the principle of competition across society requires
a speciﬁc type of governance: “creating calculable spaces to monitor outcomes
(relying heavily on auditing, targets, and ranking)…”58 In other words, progress
must be measured in order to maximize competition in between social actors. Quanti-
tative analysis is thus the dominant mode of assessment; considered as the most objec-
tive way to set benchmarks and assess how well individuals perform.59
How is this dominance of neoliberal practices in knowledge production reﬂected in
US democracy promotion? The main expression of neoliberal practices in US democ-
racy promotion consists in the ever-present principle of competition in how USAID
manages its relations with recipients of aid and in the reduction of its activities into
a sequential technical agenda of measurable outcomes with the aim to insert capitalism
in developing societies.
The introduction of Partnering with USAID: Building Alliances leaves little doubts
regarding the purpose of US foreign assistance: “furthering America’s foreign policy
interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citi-
zens of the developing world.”60 It is interesting to note that for all the discourses on
democracy, ownership of development and sustainability, a free market economy and
its principles of rationalization, eﬃciency, proﬁt making and risk-taking remains
central to an American conception of development, not only as an end in itself but
also as organizing principles of how development aid is dispended. Indeed, USAID
insists that the most eﬃcient way to achieve development is to “embrace a culture of
risk-taking and entrepreneurship that has driven much of our progress and
prosperity”.61
Competition, as regulatory mechanism, creates a bias in the attribution of contracts;
in a competitive market some are more equal than others. This competitive selection
process impacts USAID partners; they must bow to eﬃciency principles that will
ensure the best return on investment for USAID. This is less an issue for governments
and multinational corporations than for smaller actors who may not have the required
expertise to go through the selection process. USAID’s obligations for FY 2012 shows
that no NGO based in developing countries is in the top 40 of USAID’s partners.62
USAID’s procurement rules condition the way private actors of democracy promotion
oﬀer their services according to the laws of the market.
Free market rules also apply to recommending democratic norms to be promoted.
Democratic rules and norms that facilitate free market economy are at the forefront
of USAID’s programmes and are also implicitly hidden in the procurement system.
For example, the document informing for-proﬁt corporations about how to partner
with USAID identiﬁes “rule of law and transparent governance” as one programme
area of public-private partnership relevant to “ﬁnance, media and ICT industries”
with the following potential areas of shared interests: “rule of law and business-friendly
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operating environment, supporting transparent elections and political processes, pro-
moting free and independent media”.63 Multinational Corporations do not object to
these as they facilitate their operations and USAID is quick to point out shared interests
in reinforcing public-private partnerships for development initiatives that “beneﬁt
businesses by mitigating risks, creating access to new markets, training workforces,
and building relationships with key stakeholders”.64 Moreover, partnering with
USAID “can lend authority and legitimacy to a business’ development eﬀorts. Develop-
ment initiatives can also create new customers and new markets”.65 USAID thus acts as
a facilitator for US businesses to develop their activities in developing countries, in turn
helping USAID to achieve development aid objectives, of which democratization is an
aspect, which in turn contributes to reach more general US foreign policy goals:
expanding democracy and free markets.
Another consequence of neoliberal aid practices concerns the willingness to
empower local governmental actors of development in order to achieve ownership
and long-term sustainability of development aid, including democracy promotion.
This is based on the premises that “successful development depends in large part on
the eﬃciency, integrity and eﬀectiveness with which a country raises, manages and
expends public resources.”66 As USAID forcefully points out, this requires working
through host country systems that need to be reformed in order to match USAID’s
expectations. This entails creating an economic climate friendly to business, notably
through oﬀering stability and predictability. Reforming host country systems thus
starts with improving public ﬁnancial management including a reform of the public
procurement system for a more eﬃcient use of public resources, greater accountability
and transparency guaranteed by “a vibrant and strengthened civil society that monitors
performance, encourages transparency and demands results”.67 But what does improv-
ing public ﬁnancial management entail?
According to USAID, achieving sound public ﬁnancial management in developing
countries means institutional strengthening of the ministry of ﬁnance, more legislative
oversight of the budget, ﬁnancial management process and civil society budget over-
sight, strengthening of government audit and internal control, and implementing pro-
curement reform.68 Procurement is considered an essential element of public ﬁnancial
management because it is the most susceptible to corruption, which is seen as threaten-
ing good governance and democracy, deterring foreign investment, crippling economic
growth and development.69
Those reforms will strengthen sustainability and develop capacity but will also facili-
tate the opening of local markets to economic globalization. Indeed, as USAID argues,
through its engagement with local government and supporting transparent rule of law,
USAID reduces regulatory risks that endanger foreign investments. USAID thus seeks
to reform local legislation by increasing transparency and support for compliance codes
and labour regulations supportive of stable operating environment for business.70
Measures that target the improvement of local systems thus aim at creating conditions
facilitating free markets – that is transforming local governmental institutions so that
they embed procedures protecting core elements of free market economy like limited
governmental control, protection of private property, open competition, etc…
In summary, neoliberal governmental practices result in the adoption of a business-
driven approach that does not widen the pool of recipients of democracy aid and allows
for greater local ownership. Instead, such practices turn democracy promotion into a
depoliticized agenda that is not open to the contestation of liberal democracy and
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free market economy identiﬁed as the two pillars of the “good society” by Western
actors: “too deeply is a generically liberal democratic discourse embedded within its
history and its political, economic, and bureaucratic discourses and structures.”71
Despite a rhetorical agreement on the nature of a “good society” and its focus on
socio-economic justice, US democracy promotion practices make this convergence irre-
levant and recipients’ knowledge claims about “good society” invisible.
Such a conclusion is problematic when considering the potential for negotiation
between democracy promoters and recipients about the meaning of democracy and
how it can help building the “good society”. Indeed, the problem is structural, not agen-
tial. Because democracy promotion operates within a neoliberal framework that
expresses the transition paradigm, knowledge about democracy that matters is essen-
tially produced by democracy promoters. The alternative is for democracy promoters
to realize that negotiating democratic knowledge is critical if democratization is to
succeed. Through a pluralization of debates about the meaning of democracy, political
and civil society in supported countries will be able to formulate a political project that
reﬂects emancipatory political futures in tune with the aspirations of their populations.
Democracy aid community and its recipients must speak the same language of democ-
racy if democratization is to be successful and if the “good society” is to be viable.
Current democracy promotion practices do not lead to a genuine empowerment of reci-
pients through a mutual acceptance of respective knowledge claims made about democ-
racy. The alternative would be for democracy promoters to engage in negotiations with
recipients to deﬁne a substance of democracy that meets MENA populations’ expec-
tations. That means allowing for the emergence of alternative claims to democratic
knowledge.
The desirable outcome: “democratic emergence” and the alternative
pathway to the “good society”
For democracy promotion to gain legitimacy through enhanced eﬃciency there is a
need to break free from hegemonic structures of knowledge production. One way to
move forward, this article argues, would be the abandonment of the transition para-
digm, its deconstruction, and reconstruction of new structures of democratic knowl-
edge. As Kuhn argues, when existing paradigms fail to deliver on their cognitive
agendas, they lose their raison d’être. They must be substituted for new paradigms.72
Moving away from linear and transitional understandings of the evolution of poli-
ties, “democratic emergence” would allow for a transdisciplinary research agenda of
the past, present, and future evolution of political societies with the aim to pluralize
democratic knowledge. Assuming that the “good society” is still most likely to be
catered for by democracy, the focus of such a research agenda would be the identiﬁ-
cation and analysis of sources of democratic knowledge understood in their multiplicity.
Rejecting the notion that the path to the “good society” is ultimately the one walked by a
combination of liberal democracy and free-markets, “democratic emergence” studies
analyse the sources and distribution of ideas, norms, principles, and institutions most
likely to deliver the “good society” without being subjugated to the shackles of positiv-
ism and neoliberal practices. How would such a conceptual move be implemented?
How much of it could be negotiated?
Such a renegotiation in the MENA context concerns a reconsideration of good gov-
ernment and the “good society”. Sadiki contends that good government, and hence the
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opportunity to deliver the “good society” to citizens, “must be grounded in a local
system of knowledge.”73 As much as democracy is a contested concept, meaning a
variety of things to a variety of actors, democratization is also a contested concept; it
is context-sensitive.74 The cookie-cutter approach to democratization has shown its
limits. A genuine engagement and understanding of the local is needed. What
matters is to generate the conditions to trigger such an engagement with local
systems of knowledge.
One way to achieve this objective is to consider the “local” as a ﬁlter; that is to inves-
tigate “locality and speciﬁcity in the assimilation, application and interpretation of
ideas, values, morals, myths, symbols and the technologies they necessitate.”75 Sadiki
contends that there are two dimensions to consider: knowledge system and social ima-
ginary. The Arab world has developed its own intellectual traditions that led to the for-
mation of knowledge system (makhzun) and social imaginary (mikhyal).76 The
makhzum as a knowledge system encompasses “cumulatively inherited and adapted
learning, spiritual, intellectual and technological” but also “engenders belonging”.77
Al-mikhyal helps people to deﬁne who they are by mapping out the world and
making sense of it. The social imaginary pictures the world in a speciﬁc way, including
the role and place of a given society in this world.78 Critically for our purpose, social
imaginaries are mutually constitutive. They are not static. They evolve through
exchange with each other. That means that there is room for negotiation of mutually
constituted values and norms. Applied to democratization and the formulation of com-
peting claims to democratic knowledge, it means that it is essential to analyse how
knowledge system and social imaginaries have interpreted and ﬁltered it: “A democratic
knowledge… suited for Arabs or the Maghrib must be created only within the local
makhzun and mikhyal and via local agency.”79 This statement emphasizes the need
for situated knowledge when it comes to democratization. Better objective knowledge
is produced when the social context of the knowers is at the heart of the analysis.
Social contexts allow and limit knowledge producers in their ability to perceive infor-
mation, conceptualize, and understand.80 When it comes to democratic knowledge, it
is thus critical to consider its contingent nature; the inﬂuence of language, history,
culture, and social imaginaries on its formation.
Yet, knowledge about “the other” remains Western-centric, elitist, and reproducing
patterns of political, cultural and social domination. As long as the foundations of such
a Western-centric democratic knowledge production are not challenged, there is little
chance that a genuine process of negotiation of democratic knowledge can unfold.
There is indeed a need to “decolonise knowledge production”81 on democracy to
move beyond cosmetic accommodations that do not question the fundamental ﬂaws
of democracy promotion conceptualization and practises. In that sense, it is essential
to move the ﬁeld of democracy promotion and its hierarchies of power away from
Western practices. It is critical, to achieve emancipation and facilitate the emergence
of genuine alternative conceptualizations of the “good society”, to allow for the emer-
gence of an Arab heterodoxy of democracy. Then, negotiations between promoters
and recipients can begin on equal footing.
Such re-negotiation, Sadiki suggests, should be rethought along heterogeneous lines
and go beyond its operationalization as pragmatic and analytical categories closely tied
to interests (that is security, hegemony, expansionism, opposition to Islamism, etc.) or
ideology-driven agenda (liberalism, capitalism).82 Sadiki calls for a “democratic knowl-
edge turn” that favours the indigenous perspective “in which themakhzun and mikhyal
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are privileged for they are the mediums of self-conception that record local experiences,
thought, practice, norms, values, continuities and discontinuities.”83 Only then, through
a locally constructed system of democratic knowledge can Arabs “engage democracy
and democratization, reﬂexively (with their own language, categories, theories, etc.)
and adaptively (co-learning with all kinds of ‘otherness’).”84 With the construction of
such democratic knowledge, Arabs can also engage in negotiated knowledge practices
with democracy promoters. Refusing to passively receive and ingest Western knowledge
systems supposed to lead to modernity, Arabs can empower themselves through epis-
temological contestation and the assertion of “know-how that balances looking to the
past with grasping the present’s learning curves so not to miss democratic futures.”85
Practically, this would involve taking into account traditional mechanism of governance
that may be radically diﬀerent thanWestern traditions of democratic governance.86 The
question is whether democracy promoters are ready to contribute to the emergence of
alternative concepts of the “good society”.
Conclusions
This contribution asks to what extent is democratic knowledge negotiated between
democracy promoters and recipients and in what way could democracy promoters gen-
erate more knowledge about recipients’ conceptions of democracy?
The article contrasts US democracy promotion and Tunisian discourses on democ-
racy and the “good society” to illustrate that a “turn to the local” never left the realm of
rhetoric. Due to democracy promotion neoliberal practices, recipients do not enter into
serious negotiations with democracy promoters about the meaning of democracy and
about how to achieve meaningful transition to a desirable political future that would
deliver the “good society”. Section two demonstrated that the dominance of the tran-
sition paradigm and neoliberal practices that organize democracy aid’s implementation
create power structures in the ﬁeld of democracy promotion that preclude such owner-
ship of democratic knowledge. Instead, democracy promoters, armed with the “right”
democratic knowledge, propose a Western-centric conception of democracy lauding
liberal democracy and free-markets as the medium through which the “good society”
will eventually come to life. As such the emergence of alternative conceptualization
of democracy grounded in local knowledge deﬁning the “good society” remains
diﬃcult.
The ﬁnal section of the article oﬀers an initial reﬂection on the relevancy of “demo-
cratic emergence” as an alternative paradigm to modernization theory and the demo-
cratic transition paradigm. This initial reﬂection, in line with the empirical theme of
the article, stems from a reading of Sadiki’s work on the need for a “democratic knowl-
edge turn” in the Arab world. Pushing Sadiki’s reﬂection further, I suggest that a fun-
damental reconsideration of the conceptual parameters that underpin democracy
promotion is needed. As the literature on democracy promotion argues, moderniz-
ation theory and the transition paradigm have little to show for when it comes to posi-
tive democratization results. A conceptual reconﬁguration of democracy promotion
along the lines of “democratic emergence” would set up the ﬁrst stepping stone on
the way to more inclusivity and ownership of democratization of countries receiving
democracy aid. This inclusivity and ownership are critical to allow for a deviation
from the liberal democracy and free-market mantra hammered by democracy pro-
motion, which has resulted in mitigated outcomes of democratization. Instead,
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opening to the door to genuine negotiations of the substance of democracy and expec-
tation of what “good society” entails would not only allow for greater ownership of
processes of democratization but also negate the current unequal power relationship
between democracy promoters and recipients of democracy aid embedded in neolib-
eral practices that allow for little to no deviation from the liberal model imposed on
recipients. The idea of “democratic emergence” requires far more work and should be
the subject of a whole book in its own right. It is hoped that this article will generate
interest in such an idea and open up a debate on its conceptual contours and possible
development.
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